Image depicts the recent Ansarallah offensive in southwest Yemen, which further consolidates their hold over the Bab El-Mandab. Yemeni government forces have, for a few weeks, attempted a counteroffensive against Ansarallah towards Dhubab along the coastal plain (far west of image, on coast) but were prevented from advancing significantly. An Ansarallah thrust southwards just west of Am-Juhar (on southern coast, where green and red areas meet) cut off the only major road connecting those forces to their supplies, and so with their situation untenable, they quickly retreated eastwards into the red area, likely with the agreement of Ansarallah to avoid a costly and time-consuming siege of enemy forces.
Image was created by @bonzerbarry on Twitter.
My weekly preamble is in spoiler tags below.
preamble
To begin with the Middle East, the tension continues to build as the third aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, finally arrives in the region. Conditions aboard the USS George Washington have noticeable deteriorated during its deployment due to the difficulty of supplying the logistics with all the US’s bases in the Middle East proper unusable, and families of the sailors aboard have been told to expect the deployment to continue until at least around March 2027. Combine all this with the US’s interceptor famine and Iran’s improvements to its anti-ship ballistic missiles, and also the general lack of efficacy shown by the Navy during the initial bout of fighting in March and April, and it becomes questionable whether having three aircraft carriers around Iran will matter terribly much if they all have to float a good 600+ miles away while undersupplied. Striking Iranian electrical infrastructure remains a possibility, but as I and many others have said many times, Iran’s leverage is the strongest it’s ever been and still keeps getting stronger as the US’s SPR dips below 280 million barrels and draws continue. Iran has also tested a good ~100 or so missiles over the last few weeks in preparation for the next round of war, and if they’re willing to use that many missiles just on tests, their stockpiles are likely in the high thousands or even low tens of thousands. Meanwhile, in Yemen, Ansarallah has broken through to the coast in a thrust southwards, which resulted in the encirclement of thousands of enemy troops. Rather than forcing a protracted and bloody siege WW2-style, Ansarallah agreed to allow the encircled PLC forces to retreat without further harm eastwards towards Aden, resulting in Ansarallah acquiring ~3000 square kilometers in a single day. They also are maintaining strikes on Saudi infrastructure, with four or five strikes on pumping stations last week alone.
It’s been a hell of a time for hacks, outages, and false alarms lately. After the big PHP incident a few weeks back, we’ve seen supermarket freezers across Europe hacked to go to higher temperatures which ruined a shitload of produce; bomb hoaxes sent at schools across Europe; several of Microsoft’s services going down for practically a whole workday on November 13th, and then later that day, all of the planes in the US were instructed to stay landed (which has only occurred a few times in history, most notably on 9/11), due to what seems like an update gone wrong, which has caused delays for days afterwards. Without a wider sense of coordination, these kinds of incidents/attacks aren’t super impactful on their own, but it has prompted anxiety across the spectrum about whether these existing vulnerabilities could be used all together in one large offensive by a state to cause domestic chaos at a critical moment. At this point I can’t imagine Western governments ever meaningfully curtailing tech monopolies to build more resilient national infrastructure, but for those outside the West, I hope that a silver lining of these incidents continuing will be that it’ll encourage them straying from Western tech companies. And briefly on that topic, the tech sector is looking even more shaky than before now, with NVIDIA’s stocks falling substantially since Jensen Huang was ousted due to extremely dubious claims that he was having an affair with a Chinese spy (the spy part is dubious, not the affair part). Huang was substantially more pro-open-source AI than many others in the AI field, which has further incriminated him in the eyes of certain analysts as China is, of course, the biggest developer of open source AIs which are much cheaper than US AI models and thus threaten their profits.
To finish on some scattered news: despite their newfound majorities, the Democrats failed to impeach Hegseth, predictably demonstrating once again that the Democrats are not materially interested in doing even the literal symbolic bare minimum to oppose the Republicans; Bessent and other US officials have moved onto military bases due to the Zionists persuading them that the Iranians are coming for them; millions of workers attended a general strike in Spain last Wednesday, their first national work stoppage in 14 years; protests and strikes are occurring across Bangladesh in the garment industry, demanding the minimum wage increase from 12,500 taka to 30,000 taka (~180 US dollars); and, according to a document obtained by the New York Times during a negotiation session in Abu Dhabi, Russia has returned to - or at least emphasized, perhaps it was always a demand in some sense of the word? - its stance that NATO forces withdraw to their 1997 positions, which would amount to a retreat across a significant swathe of eastern Europe.
Please check out the RedAtlas!
The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.
The Zionist Entity's Genocide of Palestine
Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:
UNRWA reports on the Zionists’ destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.
English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.
Mirrors of Telegram channels that have been erased by Zionist censorship.
Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Sources:
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.
Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.
Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:
Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.
https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.
Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:
Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


Well the rational thing for China to say is “sure we’ll agree to a cap, how about 2800 warheads applicable to all parties. Now since we don’t have 2800 nuclear warheads we’re going to keep building for a while. Meanwhile the US and Russia have over 4000 each so according to this agreement if you sign you should start decommissioning your weapons in a verifiable way. Also warheads under your command control count against your total USA so if you give 100 to Germany that still counts as yours as long as you have any say over their usage.”
And they can offer that as a starting point, ask the US and Russia to get to that lower level and then say once all parties have been abiding by that awhile it will make sense on the basis of that trust to negotiate further reductions to be decided in future. I do think China agreeing to less than ~1600 warheads would be foolish as they need enough to not only totally devastate the USA, overcome its intercept network (1.5 - 2 warheads per target seems rational) but also devastate NATO in Europe, devastate Japan and occupied Korea. And potentially devastate Australia and New Zealand given their increasing aggression in forming anti-China defense pacts. And also some left-overs to dissuade nuclear armed India should anything of China survive after such a war to keep them from invading and taking half of China as theirs.
But you’re right the US isn’t going this from a point of being generous or even reasonable but likely to angle to advantage itself by having fewer warheads its golden dome intercept network needs to work on. Current US nuclear strategy does seem to be leaning towards creating conditions where they can use nukes on a nuclear armed adversary but take a much lesser blow in return thus emerging as the winners as General Buck Turgidson would tend to view it. The whole lie about “rogue states” like the DPRK and needing to intercept their nukes because they’d just irrationally launch on the US for no good reason is really weak. The tyranny of these calculations was always that it was cheaper to just build more nukes to overcome an interceptor network than it was to build enough interceptors to reliably stop even 90% of them. But if you get your enemies to willingly cap those numbers low enough and maybe count on the ability to hack, use NSA space teams, special electronic warfare satellites, etc to disable enemy sensing, C&C, and/or disable or render less effective enemy interceptor networks then you have a viable plan for a sneak nuclear attack in which you’re convinced you come out the winner while they come out the loser.
Frankly I could see the US agreeing to limit development on interceptors but not actually do it. Nukes are a lot easier to regulate, count, and inspect than interceptor rounds and systems which could be easily hidden, built in secret, sourced using complex global supply chains (e.g. zionist entity, Ukraine, EU + US) to build secretly, etc. They could always build a next generation of starlink satellites with some hidden quad-shot interceptor system in them as well with high reaction time using onboard sensors. Just a lot of opportunities for US perfidy that I think the Chinese approach not to trust the US or be to eager to agree is an intelligent one. Ideally something gets done and some limits are placed but I just don’t know. Hopefully the parties will at least need to agree to limit salvos of dual-capable missiles like Oreshnik to prevent misunderstandings about a first wave strike of nukes. No one is going to see a single or two such launches as definite sign of a first strike because logically you’d want to hit them with more than that though US ability to use hidden submarines right off the coast to join additional munitions with 5-10 minutes to delivery warning max complicates such good faith assumptions on the part of China and Russia I feel. In many ways it feels like the genie has escaped the bottle at this point with US NATO expansion, stationing of nukes closer to Russia, Japan teasing developing nukes and the increased speed on these newer delivery vehicles and the US is really the only one to blame for all of that via decades of deliberate policy choices at this point.
First, the three parties would have to define what counts as a warhead. It is not as simple as it seems. For instance, the current framework on strategic systems (range > 5500km) is New START, which expired in February 2026. Under that framework, the limit is 1550 deployed warheads. Every MIRV counts as a warhead, so a single ICBM or SLBM counts as multiple warheads. This means a single RS-28 Sarmat ICBM can count as up to 16 warheads if fully armed. But a bomber is counted as a single warhead, even if it’s equipped with multiple nuclear missiles or bombs. This means, for example, that a B-52H bomber counts as a single warhead, even though it can carry 20x nuclear armed cruise missiles. So the actual amount of nuclear warheads in service is significantly higher than 1550, and favours bombers on raw warhead count. A bomber does take a lot longer to reach it’s target than an ICBM, in fairness. New START also limits deployed SLBM tubes, ICBM launchers (silo and mobile) and bombers to 700, and 800 for deployed and non deployed systems.
New START did not regulate tactical systems, only strategic ones. With the INF treaty in place (banning ground launched missiles with a range of 500-5500km), tactical systems were limited to SRBM with under 500km range like the Iskander, and gravity bombs from dual capable tactical fighter aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C/D, F-35A. That’s where the warhead sharing agreements took place between the USA and NATO nations for example, and Russia and Belarus. However the INF treaty is now dead, and China was never a part of it anyways, meaning on the tactical level, China has lots of nuclear capable/dual capable, Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle equipped SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs already deployed, which the USA and Russia do not have currently. So any future treaty is going to have to navigate a post-INF world. China will never agree to give up such systems, which means that the USA and Russia will build them again. The USA is already bringing back nuclear armed Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Dark Eagle-N seems like an inevitability. Oreshnik/RS-26 Ruzbeh can be equipped with nuclear armed MIRVs in future too, and longer range SRBMs/MRBMs such as Iskander-1000 can be nuclear armed. I don’t see any way to avoid a large tactical nuclear build-up post INF. “A new START tactical”, is probably our best hope, separate treaty for tactical systems. Maybe all three countries can agree on a compromise, the USA and Russia with the advantage on the strategic side, and China on the tactical side, can meet somewhere in the middle. Limit strategic warheads to a certain level China will build up towards, limit the USA and Russia on to a certain level on tactical warheads which they will build towards. But I have little hope.
On limiting defensive measures, the USA got the USSR to agree to the ABM treaty by demonstrating ICBM ranged Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles capable of 100G turns (MBRV), and Hypersonic Glide Vehicles capable of thousands of km of glide and 25G turns (BGRV) mounted on Atlas rockets, to demonstrate in testing (observed by the USSR) that they could reliably defeat Soviet ABM systems if needed. To keep the USSR sticking to the ABM treaty and SORT limits, the USA developed the AMaRV, a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle capable of 100G turns and extended glide phases, using ring laser gyros (a technological first) for independent and highly accurate navigation and guidance, that was the same size as the MIRVs on the Minuteman and Peacemaker ICBMs. This meant each Peacemaker could carry 12x AMaRVs plus decoys. The US agreed never to deploy AMaRV, the USSR stuck to the ABM and SORT limits. China and or Russia would have to demonstrate similar technology vs US strategic missile defence efforts such as AEGIS Ashore, Golden Dome, etc. Which they are attempting to, Avangard HGV, low level run in on Topol-M MaRVs, China putting HGVs on fractional orbital bombardment systems in testing, etc. However the big diffence now is conventional ICBM ranged systems are viable given modern guidance, they were not previously. So to get an opponent to abandon missile defence is more difficult than before. Maybe agreeing to a ban on ICBM ranged conventional systems in exchange for a limit or ban on strategic missile defence?
Who is to blame is a difficult question. In hindsight, more effort should have been made to preserve the INF treaty. But that would have required China to show interest in joining, which they never did. China used being not part of the INF to great advantage for themselves, developing the most capable tactical ballistic missile arsenal (both nuclear and conventional) in the world. Without China, the treaty was bound to fail. The USA probably regrets signing onto the INF at all now, a big win at the time, but in hindsight they would’ve deployed those MaRV equipped Pershing-II nuclear armed MRBMs to South Korea, to dissuade a North Korean nuclear breakout, instead of destroying them, and continued development and deployment of this technology when they had the lead, instead of handing the lead in deployed systems to China. Russia probably benefitted the most from INF, which is why I’m still perplexed by their public disregard for it’s limits with the development of Iskander-K and RS-26 during the 2010s. Maybe they viewed INF collapse as inevitable and saw they were behind technologically and needed as much time as possible to work on this.