I’m pretty sure Iran mined the Strait at the start of the war, that’s the whole point of the Iranian controlled corridor, mining the waters outside of it so ships have to use the Iranian corridor. It’s just that the US can also de-mine it, even if it took them months, they appear to have demined a corridor close to the coast of Oman.

Also for the UAE to export, they don’t need to transit the Strait, due to favorable geography. This is why the UAE was initially so supportive of US military escort for oil tankers, and Saudi Arabia initially against it.

But going back to MoU rates of oil outflow doesn’t fix that, because we are there already, matching MoU rates, and the energy crisis is still where it is. Oil outflow would need to be significantly closer to pre war levels than now/the MoU. I question if that’s even possible for Iran to offer as a concession in a deal (in exchange for concessions from the US) or for the US to achieve militarily. Even if the Strait was “fully open” tomorrow, there has to be adequate supply and demand to go back to 20+ million barrels of oil per day transiting.

Saudi Arabia shifted to loading ships on their east coast in the Persian Gulf after the east-west pipeline got shut down by attacks, utilising this US escort scheme. Above graph does not include the Red Sea, which is why it looks like Saudi Arabia went from nothing to a lot. China is a big buyer of Saudi oil, and from other Gulf states too

Satellite images of tankers off the Saudi Arabian east coast, each tanker identified

This is a useful website to see exactly which crude oil tankers are transiting per week, China had 7 of the 56 last week

I don’t think it’s that per se, because the US military provides escort for oil tankers heading to China through the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman every night and during the day now. It’s more that any deal which involves going back to the MoU, which this deal was centred on, is dead on arrival because current oil outflow matches MOU levels if Iranian oil export during the MoU is excluded. What is the incentive there on the US side if outflows look like this, 13.5 million barrels per day on a 7 day average currently?

Source

That peak in the middle is the MoU, with Iranian outflows in dark blue at the bottom. Why would the USA go back to the MoU if they can achieve the same results without it, and without Iran exporting oil? Iran could export during the MoU, they cannot now. Yes there is substantially increased cost and risk, but that is not going to go to zero over a 7 day deal. If the deal is going to work by Iran offering something in exchange for the USA offering something, Iran is going to have to offer up more than the MoU did on the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, oil flows much closer to pre war levels for instance. I question if that’s even possible, it’s not something either the US or Iran can guarantee. Cooperation between both the parties buying and selling oil would be needed to ensure demand and supply is sufficient for a “re opening” to pre war levels.

RM-48U has a warhead option called the 28B6A which replaces the telemetry section and weighs 199kg. Which actually bigger than the Zircon warhead of 120kg. So they can be equipped with warheads if not used as a penetration aid. It’s quite modified compared to the original training targets.

Making those small solid fueled rocket motors for the PAC-3 is still a significant technical challenge. The Aster 30 uses cold gas thrusters for altitude control, like satellites. It’s not a liquid fueled or solid fueled rocket being used for that. THAAD Talon is the system which uses a complex throttlable liquid fueled rocket motor based system to keep the target in view of the seeker and maneuver towards it. Aster 30 is the “simplest” of all the systems when viewed like that, and THAAD the most complex.

Wouldn’t 500km from Chabahar as the original poster claims in follow up posts, still be in range of multiple Iranian ASBMs, from Zulfiqar Basir, Dezful, Qassem Basir mentioned by the poster, and the new Kheibar Shekan Basir? Kheibar Shekan has a range of 1400km. Is the US Navy further from Iran? Yes, but it’s still well within range of the missile systems mentioned by the original poster. A more useful metric would be to look at Iranian anti ship missile systems with a 300-500km maximum range, as that’s how far the US is now, 500km, when they were 200-300km away previously. The move suggests that the either the US Navy doesn’t want to be overwhelmed by anti ship missile systems in the 300-500km range class like Fateh Mobin and Raad 500 now (which was not a concern previously in the war), or that Iran is firing longer range missiles from further inland, or even a combination of both. The carriers being further away does complicate targeting as mentioned, long range kill chains are difficult. That could suggest an improvement in the Iranian kill chain at the previous ranges.

Why would the US even want to implement the MOU when oil flows coming past the Gulf of Oman blockade line already match MOU levels (excluding Iranian oil), and have for for most of this month? MOU flows were also not close to pre war flows.

Yes it’s an very expensive and intensive military escort scheme for oil tankers that is not hermetic (with oil tankers getting hit on occasion) but it is happening. Any deal that involves “opening the Strait” as an offer from the Iranian side in exchange for something from the American side is going to have to offer more than what the MOU did in terms of that, because MOU flows are being matched now. And that is a complex system that neither the US, Iran, the Gulf states, and China can control or exert full influence on the situation, the Gulf states have to export the oil and there has to be buyers and demand for it. If China doesn’t want to buy oil at pre war levels, it doesn’t matter how much supply there is. If the Gulf doesn’t want to export, it doesn’t matter how much demand there is from China and Europe. There’s also been destruction of refining capacity, an excess of raw material in crude oil does not bring back destroyed refineries online. Which means it’s questionable that a quick 7 day deal can even be made in the first place to “open the Strait” with some guarantee of oil flow to ease the markets, should that be the goal of any deal. The situation cannot go back to a pre war status that quick.

Nitter.cf is easier to remember and works

Overall this is a massive problem in civil and military aviation globally. Pilot shortages in the future (over 600 000 newly trained pilots are going be needed over the next two decades according to current estimates, makes the USAF shortage look tiny), Air Traffic Controller shortages currently, and the post COVID economic and geopolitical situation currently make it all very difficult. There are still backlogs of aircraft orders from COVID related delays, and the oil market making fuel expensive also effects things, even with shortages there are no guaranteed jobs, airlines still shut down due to that or mismanagement. Washout rates are also very high in aviation.

Also, the Gulf nations just want to buy everyone out for their airlines and airports, so lots of experienced pilots and ATCs go there to earn large sums of money at the peak of their careers before they retire, and these experienced professionals cannot be replaced by new recruits, who need years and years of training and experience at minimum to get to that level, 15-20 is not an exaggeration on average. Yes exceptional people can reach those levels significantly quicker , but those are the exceptions, not the average. Even Gulf militaries buy out experienced pilots and maintenance crew as “trainers and advisors” to maintain all their US and European equipment and train pilots. Which does effect the military side of things. And most nations civil and military aviation institutions (both private and state owned in the case of civil aviation) simply cannot compete with the Gulf oil money. No amount of retention plans and payments is going to beat out the Gulf nations throwing out very high tax free earnings for those who want to move.

Well European production currently is real low, 100 annually and 300 by 2028 for Aster… Patriot PAC-3 MSE is around 700 a year currently and aiming for 2000 a year longer term, so Aster is well behind long term if Ukraine don’t locally manufacture it.

Other option from the Ukrainian side medium term which they are trying to get going is to fire ballistic missiles at Moscow in an eye for an eye type attack, with production of the solid rocket motors in Denmark. Overall I don’t see the war ending soon and see that as a possible outcome. Russian response to such actions, I’d expect to be big. Overall more escalation between NATO and Russia.

Fixed now, hopefully.

Implication is low sortie rate further inside Yemen (already observed) and risk adverse tactics, like using one way attack drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles for deep strikes. Also already observed.

Ukraine was struck by 20 ballistic projectiles last night, in a multi layered attack, according to English translation of Ukrainian and Russian telegram channels by AMK mapping:

• 6x Iskander-M SRBMs. Self explanatory.
• 4x RM-48U (48N6 type missiles from the S-300 and S-400 air defence systems used in a ground attack role and as penetration aids).
• 4x Kn-23 SRBMs (North Korean analogue of the Iskander)
• 4x P-800 Oniks-M ramjet powered supersonic cruise missiles (however launched on a high-low trajectory, reaching altitudes of 14 000m/46 000ft to extend range during the high portion of the semi ballistic trajectory. Image is from shorter range standard Oniks)

• 2x Zircon Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) equipped ballistic missiles (with a rocket motor on the MaRV, similar to Indian Agni-II, Iranian Fattah-1, Pakistani Shaheen-I, Chinese DF-11A, etc. Zircon is not a scramjet powered hypersonic cruise missile as initially believed.)

Interception was very limited due to a lack of anti ballistic missile interceptors, in particular PATRIOT PAC-3/PAC 3 MSE, all US stocks diverted to the Middle East because of the Iran war. European nations used to purchase PAC-3 MSE for Ukraine from US stocks, this is not possible anymore. And despite Ukraine trying to get local production licenses for PATRIOT missiles, this would be for PATRIOT PAC-2 manufactured by Raytheon, not PAC 3 MSE manufactured by Lockheed Martin. As confirmed by the Ukrainian President Zelenskyy himself. So no local production for PAC-3 MSE. While PAC-2 can intercept ballistic missiles, it is limited ,it cannot do so as effectively as PAC 3 and PAC 3 MSE, which has much greater maneuverability, particularly at high altitudes giving it a significantly higher engagement ceiling and protected radius, and triple to quadruple the magazine capacity. (16x PAC-3 per launcher, 12x PAC-3 MSE per launcher, vs 4x PAC-2 per launcher). The US providing S-300P ammunition will not change the situation either, the S-300P was not designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Even with upgraded radars, (project Freyja), this will be a limited anti ballistic capability. Thus for the medium term, Ukraine will not be defended against ballistic attacks, just like 2022.

Why is PAC-3 MSE so sensitive In terms of technology and complex to manufacture? This is due to it being a hit to kill/kinetic interceptor using 180x lateral thrusters (altitude control/divert motors) with a sophisticated active radar homing seeker. There are very few nations in earth with the industry to even produce this. As for similar interceptors, there are only a few in existence: the HQ-9C/HHQ-9C from China, the 9M96 series from Russia in the S-350 and S-400, and KM-SAM Block-II from South Korea (which involved significant technology transfer from Russia with regards to the 9M96 interceptors and S-350 air defence system. South Korea pulled of an incredible deal there to get access to this technology). That’s it. In short, Ukraine lacks the industrial capacity to locally produce this, like almost every country.

In short, this means Ukraine is vulnerable to advanced ballistic attacks for a medium term period. PAC-2 and upgraded S-300P/Freyja only give limited ballistic missile defence (especially against Zircon and other maneuverable class missiles). Thre are very few PAC-3 MSE available. South Korea will not sell KM-SAM Block-II, the order book is full. The European SAMP/T system currently cannot intercept ballistic projectiles due to a lackluster radar, only SAMP/T NG will add ballistic missile defence capabilities, but Aster 30 production is very low (100 a year currently). Ukraine’s best bet longer term is to locally produce Aster 30 interceptors for the 8x SAMP/T NG systems they will get ahead of France and Italy (2x next month apparently), with the license for Aster 30 production secured from France as European production is anemic (goal is 300 annually by 2028…). This should be capable if the new radar works, the Aster 30 missiles use a different lateral thruster system, with four larger thrusters instead of over 100 small ones, giving it anti ballistic capability at higher altitudes and the ability to engage MaRV type systems and maneuverable ballistic missiles.

But this is a long term solution relying on Ukrainian local production of something they’ve never built before and does not change the medium term picture for Ukraine. A long winter ahead…

It’s quite notable as it’s the first confirmed kill by what is likely a radar guided system on a manned aircraft since the US and Israel started bombing Yemen, before bombing Iran on multiple occasions. It’s clear that the Saudis lack the SEAD/DEAD capabilities of the US and Israeli air forces, and that Ansar Allah/Houthis in Yemen operate double digit class SA systems. Also, the Saudi pilots are most probably dead, they took a 150lb warhead to the face. There is a big difference in warhead size between short range IR SAMs and MANPADS, usually a few lbs and hits the rear aspect further from the cockpit, and this, much, much larger warhead from the side aspect. Which is why both pilots of the US F-15E that was shot down survived, and the F-35 that was hit was able to land and return to a US base.

I don’t have the time to do a write up on the Ansar Allah/Houthi shoot down of the Saudi Arabian Royal Air Force F-15SA, but I have found one which is correct in the technical aspects. Highly recommended reading it. Link here to the analysis

In short, this is not the typical Yemeni/Iranian shoot down of a lower flying tactical fighter aircraft with an infrared guided system, such as a MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence System) or short range IR SAM. The flight time of the SAM, 24-25 seconds, and burn time of the rocket motor of the SAM, 15 seconds, rules this out. The hit on the F-15, from the side aspect, with a proximity fused SAM with a large warhead in the video, also makes a MANPADS or IR SAM highly unlikely. Also, the countermeasures system of the F-15 deploys chaff (metal strips designed to distract radar seekers), not flares. All of this suggests a hit by a larger, radar guided missile. The most likely candidate is the Barq-1/2, which is the Ansar Allah/Houthui designation for the Iranian Taer 2 SAM fired by the Raad/Tabas/3rd Khordad air defence system (The missile itself is shipped in a disassembled state to Yemen in a knockdown kit, and assembled locally, according to photographs of intercepted Iranian arms shipments), which is itself an analogue of the Russian 9M317 SAM fired by the Buk/SA-11/SA-17 air defence system. The Iranian air defence systems use a chassis similar to the MZKT-6922 chassis as the Buk-2ME. the In other words, an F-15 got hit by a Buk class system, highly mobile radar guided medium range air defence system.

It is hypothesised that an electro optical infrared system was used to initially passively detect the aircraft, after which the mobile Buk class air defence system turned on it’s fire control radar and engaged the Saudi F-15 successfully. The correct countermeasures in chaff were deployed by the aircraft, but the pilot made the incorrect decision to try out climb the missile, which has an altitude ceiling of 25km/82 000ft and a burn out velocity of up to Mach 4. Even with full afterburner on an F-15EX/SA as visible in the video, this was an unsuccessful attempt from the pilot to out climb the missile.

The conclusion from this is that Saudi Arabia is struggling to suppress pop up radar guided threats, highly mobile systems that can turn off their emitters (radars), pop up anywhere, turn on their radar, engage, and turn it off. Most air forces would struggle with that. The US has specific anti radiation missiles like the AGM-88E AARGM to suppress such mobile air defence systems which use shutdown tactics (with the AARGM having a millimetre wave radar seeker to track systems which relocate, in addition to anti radiation homing and GPS/INS), with emissions detected and geilocated via satellite, 5th generation aircraft and specialised 4th generation aircraft in the vicinity such as the EA-18G and F-16CMs equipped with AN/ASQ-213 HTS. The Saudis have made the questionable procurement decision of purchasing just F-15s from the USA, an aircraft not really used to suppress air defences historically, with a limited amount of less sophisticated AGM-88 HARM and ALARM anti radiation missiles. Now they want F-35s to solve this.

Biggest concern would be the radar absorbent material on the F-35 canopy.

Australia is planned to be the USA’s aircraft carrier of sorts in the Pacific, with bases being modernised to host US Air Force strategic bombers.

Denmark are also making solid rocket motors for Ukraine’s future ballistic missiles, which will have significant range, delivering an 800kg warhead over 850km away for the FP-9. In other words, designed to deliver significant explosive mass to Moscow, that is the clear intention.

Not for the next decade at least. And European nations stealth fighter projects are on the very high end 5.5/6th Gen generation, unit cost will for GCAP will probably be 3x of an F-35A ($240 million), and a lot bigger physically. Think a European J-36. Europe is not interested in making a direct competitor to the F-35, the US has cornered the market in that segment amongst it’s allies, and European companies were already significantly involved in the F-35 programme.

The only countries with the industrial capacity to mass produce stealth fighters at the moment are the USA and China, and it will remain that way for another decade at minimum. Russia is well behind both with the Su-57, which is more of a “4.75” generation fighter, and lacks the characteristics to be very low observable, known as stealth. Which is very disappointing, I was a big fan of the Su-57, but it’s clear it doesn’t deliver what one would expect from a 5th generation stealth fighter. Which is why India rejected it a few years ago, though India may be forced to accept Su-57s as the best option left to them, as there is no way the USA will sell India F-35s, and China could sell J-35 stealth fighters to Pakistan, leaving the India at a significant disadvantage. Even just a squadron or two of Pakistani J-35s would pose a very significant problem for India should it deliver on it’s claimed performance. The Su-57s biggest advantage over European 4.5 generation aircraft like the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale is it’s internal weapons bays.

It was a great aircraft for it’s time, which has now passed. If you’re not stealth these days in contested airspace, you’re vulnerable. The previous Saudi F-15SA looked to have been shot down by an Iranian/Yemeni version of the Buk/SA-11/SA-17 air defence system. These double digit SA systems are a significant threat vs 4th generation aircraft. And the gap between 4th generation and 5th generation aircraft, in survivability vs ground and aerial threats, is much bigger than the general public thinks. Google “F-22 Red Flag kill ratio” to get an idea of the numbers. 144:0. Or 241:2. That’s for air to air combat. Suppressing an air defence network is similar in the performance differential. The US military has publicly said that none of their 4th generation aircraft would get anywhere close to China in the start of a hypothetical war where the US needs to suppress the Chinese integrated air defence network.

Which is why China is mass producing stealth aircraft at breakneck speed, J-20s (500-600 already) and J-35s now. And why the USA has produced over 1300 F-35s for itself and export customers. This is not the future anymore for superpowers, it’s the present.

The full text of the new Greenland-USA-Denmark deal has been released. It is worse than expected. There are some substantial differences versus previous agreements, and some clauses are particularly egregious in regards to Denmark and Greenland giving up sovereignty. Greenland is now a protectorate of the United States, and this is not hyperbole. I don’t know how Danish and Greenlandic politicians can defend this when they said that sovereignty was maintained.

Clause VI, “United States military access, basing and overflight”, is the most egregious of the agreement:

As regards United States access to the rest of the territory of Greenland (including the Territorial Waters), the following shall apply:

i. With a view to ensuring a secure and effective operation of the Defense Areas, the United States of America shall enjoy, for its public vessels and aircraft and its armed forces and vehicles, the right of free access to and movement between the Defense Areas through Greenland, including the Territorial Waters, by land, air and sea. This may also apply to unmanned military installations subject to agreement by the Parties on the modalities at the time of establishment;

ii. United States aircraft may fly over and land in any territory in Greenland, including the Territorial Waters, and United States public vessels may have undersea access to and movement within the Territorial Waters, without restriction except as mutually agreed upon by the Parties;

iii. United States public vessels shall be given such additional access to and movement within the Territorial Waters as is agreed to by the Parties at any given time to be required by the military situation for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Greenland, and the American continent, or for other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.

The US gets unrestricted access to Greenlandic territory for all of it’s military. That “except as agreed upon by the parties” (all three nations) talk means that the USA gets real veto power on any new agreement or limits regarding this, as all three nations have to agree. And I don’t see the US giving up these newly acquired “rights”. I can’t even see what “additional access” the US military would want when they are free to operate on all of Greenland’s territory, any additional access is a formality when the US military can now freely move between “defence areas” in Greenland by land, air and sea, as explicitly stated.

The US also gets real veto power with regards to non NATO military bases and non NATO and/or non EU investment in Greenland. The agreed upon by all parties talk again means an effective USA veto. Meaning the US makes the final decision, this particularly egregious with regards to foreign investment. If a non NATO and/or non EU nation wants to invest directly in Greenland, explicit US approval is a requirement.

IX. Establishment of manned or unmanned military installations by third states

No state that is not a member of NATO shall be allowed to establish its own manned or unmanned military installations in Greenland nor shall they be allowed a persistent presence of military forces in Greenland, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

X.Foreign direct investment and other activities

Given the threat to national security and public order posed by increased efforts by adversaries to expand influence and control in Greenland, the Parties agree that states or investors from a state that is not a member of NATO, a NATO partner, or an EU member state shall not be allowed to have (i) control, (ii) significant influence, or (iii) access to non-public information that may constitute a threat to national security or public order within Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities in the territory of Greenland (including the Territorial Waters), unless agreed between the Parties that the activities of such states or investors would not constitute a threat to national security or public order.