Compounding this vulnerability, the U.S. National Defense Stockpile had no gallium reserves when China imposed its December 2024 ban. The Trump administration’s February 2026 launch of Project Vault — a $12 billion public-private initiative to stockpile critical minerals — is a step in the right direction, but even under optimistic projections, domestic production will only reach 10 to 15 percent of national consumption by 2030. China-based Innoscience, the largest 8-inch gallium nitride foundry in the world, leads in manufacturing capability. It also holds nearly 30 percent of the global gallium nitride power device market. This manufacturing capability is what matters in wartime. Silicon and gallium nitride are distinct materials, but analyzing the policy and decision-making surrounding the two reveals striking parallels. The United States pioneered the silicon transistor, then watched domestic companies offshore and cede manufacturing to foreign competitors through failed intelligence oversight and ill-advised technology transfers. This gave rise to the foundry model and paved the way for Taiwan to dominate silicon manufacturing. The gallium nitride story is following the same arc. The United States government pioneered gallium nitride through decades of government-funded research and maintains the majority of revenue in gallium nitride radio frequency devices, with U.S. companies dominating the defense and telecom segments. But the United States has never built the high-volume manufacturing infrastructure to match its design leadership. China has done so, through state-backed initiatives that mirror the government-driven industrial policies Japan and Taiwan used to dominate silicon. The gallium failure poses one critical distinction from the silicon blindside: In the latter case, silicon dominance was merely ceded to countries within the U.S. sphere of influence. A loss of gallium nitride excellence, however, hands victory to a direct strategic adversary.

Building a Heterogeneous Integration Supply Chain

The U.S. government must invest directly in national security-related technology companies and startups, with the taxpayer as the investor. The fabless mindset has led to an overfocus on designing chips and offshoring manufacturing. The United States needs an industrial revolution in heterogeneous integration: a standalone Department of Defense program authorized under Defense Production Act Title III, with four mandates. The Department of Defense’s newly established Economic Defense Unit — created to align defense strategy with economic competition and secure access to critical capabilities — could be the right vehicle to execute them.

the unit they’re staffing entirely with private equity guys and bankers? that unit?

it’s really funny to keep reading article after article pointing out obvious failings of US industrial policy and seeing how not a single one suggests nationalization

First, establish a framework of standalone, dual-use advanced packaging production facilities. Each facility must be government-funded, industry-operated,

ah, of course, gotta be industry-operated!

and located near defense customers and cleared workforces. They should not be co-located with university research fabs. Academic fabs have few security boundaries, with foreign nationals roaming freely through them. Moreover, the competing demands of basic research distract from production. Sites near the Boston Route 128 corridor, Huntsville, Dallas-Fort Worth, and San Diego place production capabilities at the edge, adjacent to radar and electronic warfare customers who need it, supplementing facilities like MIT Lincoln Laboratory, rather than replacing them. These facilities must be dual-use: The defense mandate builds them, while revenue from wireless, power electronics, and data center market sustains them. The Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology consortium of the 1980s excluded smaller companies and stagnated when government funding ended. The National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program piloting facility sits today with no funding or operator. These facilities must carry milestone-based production targets, not research outputs. Second, establish a grant and equity program spanning the full heterogeneous integration supply chain, from gallium nitride wafer growth through advanced packaging. Startups will be the primary source of innovation in this space,

STARTUPS ARE GONNA FIX IT

as is the case now in many defense technologies. The government must inject startups at every stage of the supply chain through direct grants and tax credits.

okay so this is straight-up just a grifting plan, it’s probably fucking commissioned by some of the aforementioned private equity ghouls or something

For production-scale facilities, the government should take equity stakes in critical companies, extending the precedent of the Trump administration’s $8.9 billion equity stake in Intel to companies for whom gallium is core. Qorvo and Wolfspeed are ideal candidates. The United States should view domestic champions not just as tickers on the stock market, but as key strategic proxies in a global competition for national security. Third, for the fabrication of gallium nitride wafers, a secure source of domestic gallium is critical. Project Vault is a foundation to build upon. Building on the Department of Energy’s TRACE-Ga initiative and the Defense Production Act Title III award to ElementUS Minerals, the government must expand funding for novel gallium extraction techniques developed by startups. Strategic partnerships must establish a “Trusted Gallium Road” initiative, a network of allied nations ensuring a constant gallium supply outside the Chinese sphere of influence. Fourth, the United States must think outside of the traditional semiconductor hubs. Advanced packaging does not require Silicon Valley types. It requires discipline, precision, and a workforce culture with deep industrial roots. The coal mining communities of Appalachia and the steelworkers of the Rust Belt, the manufacturing communities that built American industrial power but then watched it leave, are the same communities that can revitalize America again — this time in the cleanroom. A workforce development program modeled on the National Defense Education Act of 1958 would effectively create a talent pipeline in these communities. Government-backed advanced packaging facilities in communities uprooted due to workforce losses can supply the warfighter and ignite domestic stimulus.

Conclusion

The United States is at a strategic crossroads. The imperative is clear: Act now, or accept a slow and steady decline leading to semiconductor mediocrity. A loss of gallium nitride excellence means a win for China. The nation cannot afford to repeat the error it made by turning its back on the production of silicon chips. The moment has come for the United States to lead a revolution in chip manufacturing, starting with heterogeneous integration.

the author?

Pradyot Yadav is a National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate fellow at MIT’s Microsystem Technology Laboratories, with a minor in public policy and security studies of emerging technologies, working on 3D chips for next-generation radar. He has worked at Raytheon, Qorvo,

oh, Qorvo, the company he suggested above for government investment?

and IBM, where he built the hardware this piece is about and other technologies core to national security. He has published several peer-reviewed publications with the IEEE. More about his work can be found at his website and LinkedIn.