A reminder that as the US continues to threaten countries around the world, fedposting is to be very much avoided (even with qualifiers like “in Minecraft”) and comments containing it will be removed.

Image (of a Jamaat e-Islami campaign rally) and much of the information below is sourced from here and here.


In 2024, the government of Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League, was overthrown in a student-led protest movement which was boosted by US interests. In the interim, Nobel laureate and dyed-in-the-wool neoliberal Muhammad Yunus was made president, and introduced a series of economic and political reforms (e.g. IMF packages and banking sector restructuring) which have sidelined the working class and aligned the country with US financial interests. Regardless of anybody’s personal feelings towards Hasina (who did indeed make many mistakes and caused many deaths), it is now very clear that the reason why Hasina was overthrown was not due to a humanitarian, anti-authoritarian impulse, but because Bangladesh had at least some measure of sovereignty while she was in power, as she accepted Chinese infrastructure investments. Certainly, the US is perfectly comfortable with genocidal dictators if they are allied with US interests.

Last week, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won over two thirds of parliamentary seats - the Awami League was banned from participating at all, and worker-aligned parties were either disallowed or decided to withdraw from participating due to repression. I haven’t personally been able to nail down what exact economic/foreign policies they want to introduce, but because of what Yunus has set up in the interim, it might not matter that much - the economic stage has been set such that no matter what party took power, they would have to accept a fait accompli. As Vijay Prashad put it, the competition between the parties is reduced to “which faction will administer austerity”?

One of the many upsetting aspects of this election was that the student movement that helped overthrown Hasina have been forced into irrelevance, despite their legitimate grievances. The “Gen Z” protestors, displeased by the prospect of being ruled by the BNP about as much as the Awami League, found themselves with odd bedfellows, and allied with the now-opposition party (the hardline Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami). They are now in a tough bind, lacking much of the necessary left-wing organization to assert a genuine political project.

This is an instructive moment for many people who are desperate for better conditions in countries that are economically struggling, including Iran with its recent protests. If your country has sovereignty from the US, you walk a very dangerous tightrope - how do you organize for better conditions in such a way that it cannot be co-opted by the US to overthrow your government and put something even more terrible in its wake? Shortly after a jubilant revolutionary moment, you are left without influence, power, or even media representation, and now yet further under the repression of Western imperialism. This is one of the many problems that the population of the non-NATO world will need to find ways to overcome.


Last week’s thread is here.
The Imperialism Reading Group is here.

Please check out the RedAtlas!

The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.

The Zionist Entity's Genocide of Palestine

If you have evidence of Zionist crimes and atrocities that you wish to preserve, there is a thread here in which to do so.

Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:

UNRWA reports on Israel’s destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.

English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.

Mirrors of Telegram channels that have been erased by Zionist censorship.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Sources:

Defense Politics Asia’s youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.

Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:

Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


  • red_giant [comrade/them, he/him]@hexbear.net
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    Gao Peiyong: boosting consumption requires profound redistribution reform

    Gao Peiyong is an Academician (学部委员) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a title reserved for the highest echelon of its scholars, and previously served as a Vice President of the government-run CASS, meaning he is at the Vice Minister level in the Chinese hierarchy.

    Speaking at Peking University on 17 January 2026, he offered a blunt diagnosis of China’s weak-demand problem: Beijing has pushed hard on stimulus, but households remain cautious because job prospects, income growth, and expectations feel uncertain. The real levers, in his view, are distribution reform, a fuller shift towards public finance, and a modern, universal social security and transfer-payment system.

    Text of speech

    Distinguished guests, teachers, and students:

    Hello everyone. The title of my remarks today is “Boosting Consumption: The Key Is to Activate the Endogenous Momentum of Household Consumption.”

    Boosting consumption, also described as expanding or stimulating consumption, is not a new topic. But at this particular moment, as the 15th Five-Year Plan period begins, the task looks different in one important respect: policy efforts to boost consumption should focus more directly on strengthening households’ endogenous willingness and capacity to consume. That is the core point that needs to be made clear.

    I. Facing squarely four new challenges

    The Annual Central Economic Work Conference has put forward the concepts of long-standing and new challenges. In the case of boosting consumption, what are the new challenges behind this familiar agenda?

    The first is the challenge to keep economic growth within a reasonable range during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China set the goal of basically achieving socialist modernisation by 2035. With only ten years remaining until 2035, the 15th Five-Year Plan period is a critical phase for laying the groundwork and scaling up efforts.

    The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China further proposed that the 15th Five-Year Plan period should deliver decisive progress towards basically achieving socialist modernisation. This is not merely a qualitative aspiration; it also comes with firm quantitative requirements. One key benchmark is that per capita GDP should reach the level of moderately developed countries. Using 2025 figures, the entry threshold is roughly US$25,000 to US$26,000. China’s per capita GDP in 2024 was US$13,500. In other words, per capita GDP would need to roughly double over the next ten years to meet that benchmark.

    This implies that China’s development agenda has entered a “countdown” phase. Any discussion of boosting consumption must therefore start from a clear premise: over the next decade, growth needs to be kept within a reasonable range.

    The second challenge is: What will drive and sustain growth within a reasonable range? A broad consensus has now formed that consumption is both the primary engine of economic growth and a stabilising anchor. Put plainly, keeping growth within a reasonable range depends mainly on domestic demand—and, within domestic demand, first and foremost on consumption. Any discussion of boosting consumption has to engage with this proposition directly.

    The third challenge is that, within the realm of domestic demand, the most prominent constraint at present is weak consumption. The Central Economic Work Conference noted that “the contradiction of strong domestic supply and weak domestic demand is acute.” The clearest expression of “weak demand” is, precisely, sluggish consumption.

    The 2025 trajectory of growth in total retail sales of consumer goods illustrates this clearly. Growth reached 6.4% in May 2025, then fell steadily, dropping to 1.3% by November. December data have not yet been released, but the trend points to a level around 1%, or slightly above. [In December, the total retail sales of consumer goods in China rose by 0.9% year on year. The data was released on 20 January, three days after Gao’s speech. —Yuxuan’s note]

    2025 was the year in which China’s fiscal and monetary policies were mobilised most intensively to support consumption, with the associated policy costs likely reaching historical highs. When the relationship between policy inputs and outcomes is taken into account, weak consumption necessarily emerges as the central issue. If the objective is to expand domestic demand, the priority must be to overcome this weakness in consumption.

    The fourth challenge is that today’s shortfall in consumption demand has distinctive features of its own. Taking total retail sales of consumer goods as the core indicator, insufficient consumption can be divided into four scenarios: volume and prices rising together; volume and prices falling together; volume rising while prices fall; and volume falling while prices rise. The weakness in consumption demand in 2025 falls squarely into the third category—volume rising while prices fall.

    Data released by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism on 21 October 2025 can serve as supporting evidence. In the first three quarters of 2025, domestic residents made 4.988 billion trips, an increase of 18% year on year, while total tourism spending reached RMB 4.88 trillion, up 11.5%. These headline figures appear robust, but the gap of 6.5 percentage points between the two growth rates is telling. Average spending per trip actually declined, from RMB 1,024 in 2024 to RMB 970.

    II. Telling four “new stories” well

    The domestic travel data cited above show a distinctive pattern in current domestic consumption: volume is rising, while prices are falling. This suggests that China’s economy has new stories to tell, and that consumption, as part of the broader economic picture, also has new stories. The basic logic behind these new developments needs to be explained clearly and made widely understood.

    The first “new story” concerns insufficient consumption demand under the intertwined dynamics of rising volume and falling prices. When discussing total retail sales of consumer goods, the scale of consumption, and related indicators, it is essential to separate the “volume” and “price” components. In essence, consumption is volume times price. At present, the main source of consumption weakness lies mainly in falling prices, and these price declines are not the result of changes in market supply-and-demand relations.

    The second “new story” is to look beyond the surface and identify what sits behind insufficient consumption demand—namely, expectations and confidence. The tourism market provides a clear example: the core reason per-capita spending has fallen is not shifting supply-and-demand conditions, but weaker market expectations and subdued consumer confidence. What looks like weak demand on the surface is, at its root, weaker expectations; what appears to be insufficient consumption is, in substance, insufficient confidence.

    The Government Work Report delivered at the 2025 National People’s Congress identifies one particularly prominent contradiction: “Sluggish domestic demand was compounded by weak public expectations .” Linking weak domestic demand with weak expectations in discussing the prominent challenges facing China’s economic performance is something that warrants special attention.

    The third “new story” that needs to be told well is the relationship between pressures on employment and income, weaker expectations, and insufficient demand.

    What has led to weaker market expectations and a lack of confidence across society? The draft proposals on the 15th Five-Year Plan issued by the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee explicitly note that current economic performance faces the challenge of “considerable pressure weighing on employment and personal income growth” The Central Economic Work Conference contains similar language.

    It is precisely these pressures on employment and income growth that have weakened households’ expectations about future job prospects and income growth, thereby suppressing current consumption demand.

    The fourth “new story” is the need to view consumption through three dimensions: demand, supply, and expectations. The Annual Central Economic Work Conference in 2021 made an important judgment with a historic turning-point significance: “China’s economic development is facing pressure from demand contraction, supply shocks and weakening expectations.”

    Re-reading this statement at today’s historical juncture, it is more than a list of problems and contradictions. More importantly, it provides a framework for understanding them. Whether the task is to discuss consumption or to assess the broader economic situation, the approach must differ from the past: demand, supply, and expectations need to be examined together, as part of an integrated analysis.

    III. Reaffirming four basic common understandings

    In exploring how to boost consumption amid profound changes in the economic landscape, several points basic to economic reasoning need to be reaffirmed and kept firmly in view.

    First, consumption is a function of income and wealth accumulation. Changes in the pattern of income and wealth accumulation shape the direction of households’ expectations and confidence. When pressures on employment and income alter expectations and lead to insufficient consumption, efforts to boost consumption must start with improving the underlying pattern of income formation and wealth accumulation.

    • red_giant [comrade/them, he/him]@hexbear.net
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      Text continues

      Second, building on past development achievements, accelerate a comprehensive shift towards public finance. Beyond regular fiscal revenues, deficit financing has become a major source of additional funds. Over the past two years, more than RMB 10 trillion has been raised through fiscal deficits and the issuance of government bonds. As consumption increasingly serves as both the main engine of growth and a stabilising anchor, it is necessary to consider directing this deficit financing primarily towards people’s livelihoods.

      Since the concept of public finance was put forward in 1998, [when the National Fiscal Work Conference, for the first time, put forward the goal of establishing China’s basic framework for a public finance system. —Translators’ note] the structure of fiscal expenditure has been continuously adjusted. How to optimise the expenditure structure and increase investment in public services and people’s livelihood remains a major task.

      Since the launch of reform and opening up, China’s fiscal system has gradually evolved from one centred on state ownership towards one accommodating multiple forms of ownership. The next step is to further expand its coverage. Second, fiscal policy needs to move towards equal treatment, shifting from a predominantly urban-based fiscal framework to an integrated urban–rural system. Third, fiscal expenditure should return to its public nature, with a stronger emphasis on public service–oriented finance.

      Third, speed up efforts to address shortcomings and weak links in the allocation of basic public services. For example, the coverage of social security and transfer payments remains selective rather than universal; the benefits they provide vary in generosity rather than being uniform. Another long-standing issue is that fiscal spending has been directed heavily toward investment in physical assets, while investment in human capital has been relatively neglected. As a result, the redistributive function of basic public services remains insufficiently strong, and the goal of equalisation is still some distance away.

      Fourth, establish a modern social security and transfer payment system. Gradually eliminate urban–rural and status-based differences, and achieve full coverage and non-discriminatory provision of social security and transfer payments, so that the benefits of public finance are shared by all members of society.

      Fifth, incorporate expectations management as an important component of macroeconomic governance. In the face of profound changes in the economic landscape, expectations management must be incorporated into the macroeconomic governance system. Three areas of work are required: first, bringing expectations factors into the macroeconomic analytical framework; second, bringing expectations factors into the setting of macroeconomic policy objectives; third, bringing reform innovation into the operational toolkit of macroeconomic management.

      Strengthening the expectations management mechanism has already been placed on the national reform agenda for macroeconomic governance. The Central Economic Work Conference has closely linked it with boosting public confidence, and stabilising public confidence is a crucial foundation for stabilising the economy.

      On the basis of these reforms, and with the goal of basically realising socialist modernisation by 2035, there remain many research questions to address and many tasks that require steady, sustained effort. These will form an important part of the policy agenda from 2026 onwards.

      Thank you, everyone!